

President Follows a 30-Year Trend in Giving Them High Posts in Crises

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—The fundamental reason why President Kennedy, a Democrat, has been summoning to high and most sensitive executive posts men more or less actively affiliated with the Republican party is not that he intends or wishes to form a coalition government, or because his paramount political strategy is to paralyze the opposition by the presence of Republican hostages in his front lines. The underlying reason is to be found in the succession of economic, social and military crises during the last thirty years of American history.

These required the recruitment to national government of the best skills in the country, with party affiliation subordinated to individual capacity.

The natural result was that President Roosevelt brought to Washington, and President Truman retained, a number of Republicans, as well as Democrats, with special aptitude for dealing with the crises of their time—the depression; then the United States re-militarization required by the outbreak of war in Europe; then our own participation in that struggle; and finally the cold war and the Korean War.

Pool of Talent

Accordingly, when President Eisenhower began his eight-year term in 1953, a reservoir of Republicans of proved ability, who had been intensively trained in Government by his Democratic predecessors, was available. His draft of this pool essentially augmented their experience. So that when President Kennedy, confronted with old crises growing more dangerous and new ones arising, looked around for the most seasoned

and demonstrated skills in international and national security fields, it was inevitable that Republicans would be prominent among those who possessed them. Roosevelt and Truman had brought, or Truman re-summoned, into government, among others, Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, John J. McCloy, Arthur H. Dean, Robert A. Lovett, William Chapman Foster, the brothers John Foster and Allen W. Dulles, Lewis L. Strauss, William A. Knudsen, Robert Patterson and John Alex McCone. Few then or later were active in politics. But all were normally Republicans. When Mr. Kennedy became President, and began his search for experienced administrators in the vital areas of military defense, other aspects of national security and disarmament negotiations, he found outstanding the records of this group. (For example, to Lovett, who was not available, he offered any of the three highest Cabinet posts).

Disarmament

McCloy, as Assistant Secretary of War under Roosevelt and High Commissioner of post-war Germany under Truman, was a leading expert in the problems of armament and disarmament and in negotiating with our Allies and the Kremlin. Dean had been United States negotiator of the truce with the Communists in Korea and was at the peak of a brilliant career as an international lawyer. There was no more qualified team to prepare the structure of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And to

head it when established, the same was true of Foster—former director of the Marshall Plan, former Under Secretary of Commerce and Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Truman Administration and co-author of the still-secret Gaither study of our military defenses.

When Mr. Kennedy became President-elect, one of his first moves was to ask Allen W. Dulles to remain for at least another year as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The nature of the office and the conditions in the world called for this continuity in the direction of the C.I.A., and for the correlated demonstration that partisan political considerations would be firmly excluded from appointments in the area of security.

Secret Operations

The operations of the C.I.A. are necessarily secret, and hence neither Congress nor the people can know more of the quality of its record under Dulles than was indicated by the President's warm praise. But what is known is that the work of the agency requires a director who is tough-minded, imaginative, impersonal, has courage and fortitude, is sound in judging the collectors of intelligence and evaluating their product, and can inspire the complete confidence of the President and Congress.

The President's conclusion from the public and private record that McCone can meet these requirements within reason is shared in Washington generally, in the shipping industry where he performed prodigies of wartime construction, and by his intimates.

Six months ago the President might have made another selection because at that time McCone, as Strauss his predecessor was doing, was continuing to argue that national security required the resumption of, at least underground, nuclear tests. And for this he was particularly unpopular with those "liberal" Democrats who were an important component of the group which successfully pressed for the nuclear testing moratorium and for its long protraction. But after Soviet Russia's brutal resumption of testing, with fall-out in the atmosphere, this particular disapproval of McCone became a minor Presidential consideration.

The C. I. A. Job

Mr. Kennedy's description of what the C. I. A. job under McCone will be—director with full authority as well as chairman of the pan-governmental intelligence board—indicates an understanding between them that, despite proposals to the contrary, the agency is to retain its function of evaluating the intelligence it collects, and its para-military operations until or unless McCone concludes from a study that the latter should be removed or distributed.

The other top Presidential appointment of a Republican was, of course, that of Douglas Dillon, to the Treasury (Secretary of Defense McNamara is a political and anyhow, Republicans are sure he voted for Mr. Kennedy in 1960). But Dillon in the Eisenhower Administration administered a non-partisan area. And, though the Republicans made a campaign issue of the prospect of Mr. Kennedy's fiscal policy, the President found Dillon in full agreement with what he has in mind.

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